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JAY ALIX, MCKINSEY, AND A LACK OF CLARITY  
ABSTRACT  
Jay Alix v. McKinsey & Co. is the product of a gaping hole in the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code: its extensive definition section does not adequately define 
various key words, including “professional persons” and “disinterested 
persons.” McKinsey & Co., one of the world’s largest and wealthiest consulting 
firms, stands accused of violating the disinterested standard set out in 11 U.S.C. 
§ 327(a) and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2014(a). McKinsey, 
however, maintains that it fully complied with the Bankruptcy Code 
requirements, and it may well be right; depending on the jurisdiction, and even 
on the individual judge, the disinterested and disclosure requirements to be 
employed under the Bankruptcy Code may vary.  
Previous bankruptcy courts have not applied a clear, consistent standard 
regarding which entities are subject to the Bankruptcy Code requirements by 
virtue of being a professional person under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a), what constitutes 
a disinterested person under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a), or what exactly an entity must 
disclose under Bankruptcy Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 2014(a) prior to 
bankruptcy employment. However, the court has just such an opportunity in Jay 
Alix v. McKinsey & Co. Neglecting to use this opportunity to clarify the 
Bankruptcy Code could lead to further lawsuits between bankruptcy 
practitioners, as well as forum shopping by bankruptcy participants, all in an 
effort to hide potentially significant connections. This Comment proposes that 
the court should adopt firm standards for both definitional issues, as well as the 
disclosure requirement, to ensure a fair, transparent bankruptcy process that is 
in accordance with the original goals of the Code and the bankruptcy system as 
a whole.   
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INTRODUCTION  
On May 9, 2018, bankruptcy turnaround expert Jay Alix filed suit against 
McKinsey & Co. in the Southern District of New York regarding the actions of 
McKinsey’s restructuring group.1 In this suit, Jay Alix—the founder and largest 
individual shareholder of AlixPartners, a major consulting firm and “turnaround 
veteran”—alleged that McKinsey & Co.—also a worldwide consulting firm that 
has recently grown its turnaround group—“conducted a criminal enterprise 
through a pattern of racketeering activity” by “knowingly and intentionally” 
submitting false and material declarations under oath in bankruptcy 
proceedings.2 Alix claims that McKinsey submitted these false and material 
declarations in order to conceal “significant connections” to interested parties in 
bankruptcy proceedings and to avoid revealing conflicts of interest that would 
preclude it from being hired as a bankruptcy professional in those proceedings.3 
Because of these alleged false and misleading declarations, Alix brought suit 
alleging racketeering activity, including bankruptcy fraud in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 152(3), and 152(6); mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1341; wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; obstruction of justice in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a); witness tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1512(b) and 1512(c); unlawful monetary transactions in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957; and inducement to interstate or foreign travel in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314.4 While this initial suit has since been dismissed, 
Alix appears to be continuing his charge, noting after the dismissal that the judge 
did not rule on the merits and that he would continue to litigate these allegations 
in other cases.5 
This is not the first such case brought against McKinsey for similar activities. 
This kind of litigation has been an ongoing problem for McKinsey that gained 
broader nationwide attention following the publication of a recent Wall Street 
Journal article highlighting the firm’s secretive nature and unwillingness to 
disclose information about clients.6 The article highlights just how differently 
 
 1 Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Alix v. McKinsey & Co., 404 F. Supp. 3d 827 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 
1:18-cv-04141).  
 2 Id. 
 3 Id.  
 4 Id. at 2.  
 5 Tom Hals, Judge Dismisses Turnaround Guru’s Racketeering Case vs McKinsey, REUTERS (Aug. 19, 
2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mckinsey-alixpartners-racketeering/judge-dismisses-turnaround-
gurus-racketeering-case-vs-mckinsey-idUSKCN1V91S1.  
 6 Gretchen Morgenson & Tom Corrigan, McKinsey Is Big in Bankruptcy — and Highly Secretive, WALL 
ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mckinsey-is-big-in-bankruptcyand-highly-secretive-
1524847720?mod=article_inline; see, e.g., Mar-Bow Value Partners, LLC v. McKinsey Recovery & 
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McKinsey views the disclosure requirements as compared to traditional law 
firms and other groups involved in the bankruptcy process. For example, during 
the GenOn Energy bankruptcy, Kirkland & Ellis billed 105 hours for 
connections and conflict disclosures.7 McKinsey, in contrast, billed five—
although it claims this is because the firm does not bill for administrative staffers 
who check for connections.8 Similarly, in the Edison Mission Energy 
bankruptcy, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld disclosed 368 connections, while 
McKinsey disclosed none.9 McKinsey has responded to criticism of this lack of 
disclosure by stating that it cannot “disclose services performed for some 
interested parties because of its responsibility to maintain strict client 
confidentiality.”10 In response to this behavior—which continued in a similar 
vein in the Alpha Natural Resources’ bankruptcy—and urging by Jay Alix, the 
U.S. Trustee in Virginia criticized McKinsey’s disclosure statements as “vague 
and amorphous.”11 Further, according to the U.S. Trustee, McKinsey “gives the 
appearance of compliance without actually complying.”12 The findings from the 
Wall Street Journal’s exposé are featured in multiple places in Alix’s suit against 
McKinsey.13  
This article, and the resulting suit against McKinsey, have brought attention 
to two definitional issues that not only resulted in the issue underlying this suit, 
but also plague law firms and other entities involved in the bankruptcy process. 
First, what does mean for an entity to be “disinterested,” and second, who must 
go through the disinterested tests and procedures as set out in 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) 
and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2014(a) (“Rule 2014”). This 
Comment explores who is considered to be a professional under the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code, what is required to be disinterested according to the Code, 
and finally, the level of disclosures required under Rule 2014. First, this 
Comment delves into what it means for a party to be a professional person under 
the Code. Second, this Comment addresses how the Code defines disinterested 
and how this definition, which lacks specificity, has given rise to numerous 
lawsuits and a split among courts. Third, this Comment considers the various 
 
Transformation Servs. US, LLC, 578 B.R. 325 (E.D. Va. 2017). 
 7 Morgenson & Corrigan, supra note 6.  
 8 Id.   
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 11 Tom Corrigan & Jacqueline Palank, Bankruptcy Watchdogs Say McKinsey’s Disclosures Are 
Inadequate, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bankruptcy-watchdogs-say-mckinsey-
disclosures-are-inadequate-1463516707?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=3&mod=article_inline (internal 
quotations omitted).  
 12 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 13 See Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
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formulations for the amount of disclosures required under Rule 2014. Finally, 
this Comment suggests that the various courts involved in the ongoing 
bankruptcy and civil suits between Alix and McKinsey, particularly in Alix v. 
McKinsey & Co., should adopt clear, easy-to-follow tests that provide a 
consistent standard to these questions across circuits. In establishing a consistent 
standard, the court should: 1) adopt the six-part test for a professional set out by 
the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re American Tissue, 
Inc.;14 2) adopt the strict definition of disinterested as set out by the Fourth 
Circuit in In re Martin;15 3) require an extensive level of disclosure similar to 
the amount set forth by the standard established by the Eleventh Circuit in In re 
Jennings;16 and 4) rule for Jay Alix in his case against McKinsey & Co. 
A. Background 
The Bankruptcy Code sets out requirements for the employment of attorneys 
and professional persons during the bankruptcy process. First, under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1107(a), the power of a debtor in possession to employ attorneys and 
professionals is the same as that of a trustee.17 Accordingly, the debtor-in-
possession “may employ one or more attorneys, accountants, appraisers, 
auctioneers, or other professional persons.”18 Additionally, if the trustee or 
debtor in possession, by virtue of § 1107(a), is authorized to run the business 
under 11 U.S.C. § 1108 and the debtor has “regularly employed attorneys, 
accountants, or other professional persons on salary, the trustee may retain or 
replace such professional persons if necessary in the operation of such 
business.”19  
Professionals must satisfy two requirements: 1) they must not hold interests 
adverse to the estate; and 2) they must be disinterested.20 Additionally, the 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure state that, to be employed as a 
professional, an application must be filed that details all of the person’s 
connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective 
attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in 
the office of the United States trustee.21 This application must be accompanied 
 
 14 See infra Section A1. 
 15 See infra Section A2. 
 16 See infra Section A3. 
 17 U.S. Trustee v. Price Waterhouse, 19 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a)).  
 18 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2019). 
 19 § 327(b). 
 20 § 327(a). 
 21 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014(a) (2018). 
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by a verified statement of the person to be employed setting forth the person’s 
connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective 
attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in 
the office of the United States trustee.22 The Bankruptcy Code defines a 
“disinterested person” as one that: 1) “is not a creditor, an equity security holder, 
or an insider;” and 2) “does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest 
of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of 
any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor, 
or for any other reason.”23 Despite this definition, questions remain over who 
exactly qualifies as a disinterested person, as well as to whom this standard 
applies, considering the lack of clarity in who is under the classification of 
“professional person.” Additionally, there is disagreement between courts as to 
the proper amount of disclosures that are required under Rule 2014; must the 
professional seeking employment detail every possible connection, or only those 
that present the threat of an actual conflict of interest?  
1. Who is a Professional Person? 
The first issue that must be considered in the case of Alix v. McKinsey & Co. 
is what exactly the Bankruptcy Code means when it refers to a “professional 
person.” 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) states that the trustee may employ “attorneys, 
accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons, that do not 
hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested 
persons.”24 Furthermore, Rule 2014(a) states that to be employed under 
§ 327(a), “attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other 
professionals” must file an application for employment that details “the person’s 
connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective 
attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in 
the office of the United States trustee.”25 These provisions are the full extent to 
which the Bankruptcy Code deals with a requirement that parties be 
disinterested. It is clear that attorneys, accountants, and appraisers must abide 
by the standards set out in § 327(a), but it is not clear what the Code means by 
the catch-all term “professional persons,” as it is not specifically defined in the 
Code.26 Courts have held a wide array of professionals to be “professional 
 
 22 Id.  
 23 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) (2019). 
 24 § 327(a). 
 25 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014(a) (2018).  
 26 Harner, Michelle M., Final Report of the ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, AM. 
BANKR. INST. (2014), https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1096&context= 
books. 
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persons,” including a management firm, a consultant for oil and gas properties, 
a firm specializing in health care receivables and collection services, realtors, a 
media broker engaged in the sale of a radio station, a company operating a radio 
station, and a head hunter.27 To better determine what Congress meant when it 
included the catch-all provision at the end of § 327(a) allowing the hiring of 
“other professional persons,” it is helpful to look at both the history of the term 
“professional,” as well as how other courts—both state and federal—have 
defined the term. 
The question of who qualifies as a professional stems from medieval times, 
originating with the guild system and the training of lawyers, doctors, and 
theologians at universities.28 While there are not many specific definitions of a 
professional in federal laws, there are a couple statutory definitions from federal 
labor and tort laws. One of the few places that the federal government has 
provided greater definitional clarification on what constitutes a professional is 
§ 152(12) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which defines a professional 
as:  
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and 
varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, 
or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion 
and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the 
output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in 
relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an 
advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by 
a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in 
an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a 
general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training 
in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes; 
or (b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized 
intellectual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph 
(a), and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of a 
professional person to qualify himself to become a professional 
employee as defined in paragraph (a).29 
However, this definition has seldom been applied by tort malpractice cases and 
is generally used in administrative cases by the Department of Labor.30  
 
 27 Regina Stango Kelbon et al., Conflicts, The Appointment of “Professionals,” and Fiduciary Duties of 
Major Parties in Chapter 11, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 349, 376–77 (1991). 
 28 See generally Michael J. Polelle, Who’s On First, and What’s a Professional?, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 205, 
212 (1999).  
 29 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (2018).  
 30 See Polelle, supra note 28, at 218 n.87. 
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State law may also provide some guidance on how to define a professional. 
Generally, states follow one of three tests for whether an individual/entity 
qualifies as a professional under malpractice law: 1) to limit the definition of 
professional to those occupations recognized as such by the common law; 2) to 
include as professions all occupations licensed by the state; or 3) to use some 
intermediate approach.31  
a. State Treatment of Professional Persons 
This first approach limits the definition of a professional to those recognized 
under early common law: doctors, lawyers, teachers, and clergy; however, 
legislatures may expand who is considered a professional.32 The second 
approach is a broad definition, holding every occupation licensed by a 
governmental entity to be a professional.33 Most states have not adopted either 
of these approaches, but have instead adopted various intermediate positions, 
including relying on the dictionary for a definition. The New York state courts, 
for example, state that a professional is: 
[D]istinguished by the requirements of extensive formal training and 
learning, admission to practice by a qualifying licensure, a code of 
ethics imposing standards qualitatively and extensively beyond those 
. . . tolerated in the marketplace, [and] a system for discipline of its 
members for violation of the code of ethics . . . .34  
Florida, in contrast, has a bright-line rule: “a ‘profession’ is any vocation 
requiring at a minimum a four-year college degree before licensing is possible 
in Florida[;]” however, there is no requirement that the four-year degree be 
specifically related to the employment in question.35 Effectively, this creates a 
two-part test: first, the profession must be one that requires a license under 
Florida law, and second, the license must require the completion of a four-year 
degree.36 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a professional as “[a] person who belongs 
to a learned profession or whose occupation requires a high level of training and 
 
 31 Id. at 218–19. 
 32 Polelle, supra note 28, at 219. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Hosp. Computer Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp. 1351, 1361 (D.N.J. 1992) (citing In re 
Estate of Freeman (Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. Freeman), 311 N.E.2d 480, 483 (1974)). 
 35 Garden v. Frier, 602 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (Fla. 1992). 
 36 See Polelle, supra note 28, at 223 n.114. 
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proficiency.”37 The Fifth Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary expanded on this 
definition and redefined a profession as:  
A vocation or occupation requiring special, usually advanced, 
education and skill. The labor and skill involved in a profession is 
predominantly mental or intellectual, rather than physical or manual. 
The term originally contemplated only theology, law and medicine, 
but as applications of science and learning are extended to other 
departments of affairs, other vocations also receive the name, which 
implies professed attainments in special knowledge as distinguished 
from mere skill.38 
b. Bankruptcy Treatment of Professional Persons: Quantitative and 
Qualitative Tests 
Generally, bankruptcy courts define professional in one of two ways.39 The 
first is a so-called quantitative test that focuses on whether the entity plays a 
central role in the administration of the estate,40 while the second is a qualitative 
test that focuses on whether the entity is given “discretion or autonomy . . . in 
some part of administration of the debtor’s estate . . . .”41 The quantitative test, 
first set out in the case In re Seatrain Lines, Inc., stated that, for the purposes of 
§ 327(a), “professional person” only applies to “persons in those occupations 
which play a central role in the administration of the debtor proceeding.”42 In 
this case, the question arose regarding whether a court order was necessary for 
the retention of maritime engineers by the debtor Seatrain.43 The court declined 
to extend § 327(a)’s requirement to the maritime engineers, stating that court 
approval is only required for “professions intimately involved in the 
administration of the debtor’s estate,” in addition to those specifically listed in 
§ 327(a).44 The court conceded that while the maritime engineers play an 
important role in the operation of Seatrain’s business, their retention would not 
affect the administration of Seatrain’s reorganization, and thus were not subject 
 
 37 In re Am. Tissue, Inc., 331 B.R. 169, 173 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1226 
(7th ed. 1999)). 
 38 In re Metro. Hosp., 119 B.R. 910, 916 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1089–
90 (5th ed. 1979)).  
 39 Harner, supra note 26. 
 40 In re Am. Tissue, Inc., 331 B.R. at 173; see In re Seatrain Lines, Inc., 13 B.R. 980, 981 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 
1981).  
 41 In re Am. Tissue, Inc., 331 B.R. at 173 (setting out six factors to be considered in determining whether 
an entity is a professional); see In re Fretheim, 102 B.R. 298, 299 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989). 
 42 In re Seatrain Lines, Inc., 13 B.R. at 981.  
 43 Id.  
 44 Id. at 981 (specifically listed parties include attorneys, accountants, appraisers, and auctioneers). 
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to § 327(a).45 The same court, applying the same test in a later case stated that 
an entity was not a professional if it did not play any part in negotiating a plan, 
adjusting the debtor/creditor relationship, disposing of or acquiring assets, or 
performing any other duties of a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.46  
Other courts, however, dismiss this quantitative test as “difficult to apply 
and subject to arbitrary and inconsistent results . . . .”47 Instead, they use the 
qualitative test which states that, for § 327(a) to be applicable, first, “an 
employee’s function must be related to the administration of the debtor’s 
estate.”48 Then, it must be determined whether an employee has “discretion or 
autonomy in some part of the administration of the debtor’s estate.”49 Under this 
analysis, approval must be sought for the employment of a person with a 
relatively small task but a large measure of discretion in performing it, but not 
sought for a person who is to perform an important but nondiscretionary task.50 
In the case In re Fretheim, there was disagreement regarding whether a land 
surveyor hired by the debtor required approval of the bankruptcy court.51 The 
court concluded that “[a] surveyor performs an essentially mechanical, 
nondiscretionary task[,]” and therefore “court approval is not required under 
§ 327(a).”52 In addition to believing the qualitative test was easier to apply, the 
court adopted this test because it is “consistent with a primary purpose of 
§ 327(a) to prevent conflicts of interest which erode the confidence of the parties 
in the administration of the estate,” as well as “public confidence in the 
administration of justice in bankruptcy courts.”53 
Still more courts have combined the two, stating that the quantitative and 
qualitative analyses need not be mutually exclusive.54 In this combined test, 
courts use the following six-factor analysis to determine whether an entity or 
person is a professional:  
(1) whether the employee controls, manages, administers, invests, 
purchases or sells assets that are significant to the debtor’s 
reorganization, (2) whether the employee is involved in negotiating the 
 
 45 Id. 
 46 Committee of Asbestos-Related Litigants v. Johns-Manville Corp., 60 B.R. 612, 620–21 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y 1986).  
 47 In re Fretheim, 102 B.R. 298, 299 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989). 
 48 Id.  
 49 Id.; see also In re Semenza, 121 B.R. 56, 57 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990). 
 50 In re Fretheim, 102 B.R. at 299. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id.  
 53 Id. (internal alterations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). 
 54 In re First Merchants Acceptance Corp., 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2245, at *7–8 (Bankr. D. Del. 1997). 
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terms of a Plan of Reorganization, (3) whether the employment is 
directly related to the type of work carried out by the debtor or to the 
routine maintenance of the debtor’s business operations; (4) whether 
the employee is given discretion or autonomy to exercise his or her 
own professional judgment in some part of the administration of the 
debtor’s estate, . . ., (5) the extent of the employee’s involvement in 
the administration of the debtor’s estate, . . . and (6) whether the 
employee’s services involve some degree of special knowledge or 
skill, such that the employee can be considered a “professional” within 
the ordinary meaning of the term.55 
This test requires an examination of the type of duties to be performed by the 
employee and whether any special skills or training is necessary to carry out 
these duties.56 When applying the factors to the facts of a case, no one factor 
should be dispositive, but the factors should be weighed against each other and 
considered in toto.57 Such courts believe this combined approach is best because, 
while the quantitative test focuses on the significance of the individual’s role to 
the debtor proceeding and the qualitative test focuses on the amount of discretion 
the individual has in accomplishing that role, the bottom line of both tests 
involves an examination of the types of duties to be undertaken by the 
individual.58 In the original application of this test, the debtor—in this case a 
chapter 7 debtor—entered into a plan in which a third party, known as UDC, 
would manage the purchase of new or used cars by customers with limited 
access to traditional sources of credit—known to the company as “receivables,” 
which constituted the bulk of the debtor’s estate.59 The trustee in the case 
objected, contending that the debtor was employing a “professional” who also 
had status as a creditor, thus precluding its involvement.60 Applying the six-
factor test above, the court held that UDC was a professional within the meaning 
of § 327(a).61 The court starts by noting it is unclear whether UDC’s 
employment pertained to the ordinary course of business of the debtor, or 
whether it pertained to the administration of the debtor’s estate.62 The 
employment of UDC was to assist the debtor with the management of the 
receivables, which is the ordinary operation of the debtor.63 However, because 
 
 55 In re Am. Tissue, Inc., 331 B.R. 169, 173 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (citing In re First Merchants 
Acceptance Corp., 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2245, at *8–10).  
 56 In re Am. Tissue, Inc., 331 B.R. at 173–74. 
 57 In re First Merchants Acceptance Corp., 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2245, at *10. 
 58 Id. at *7–8.  
 59 Id. at *10–11. 
 60 Id. at *5. 
 61 Id. at *9–10. 
 62 Id. at *10. 
 63 Id. at *10–11. 
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the receivables were “so vital to the underlying estate,” UDC’s role in the 
administration of the estate would be “quite significant.”64 Because the 
receivables comprised the majority of the debtor’s estate and UDC would have 
such authority in managing these assets, the court concluded that UDC’s role 
was “akin to that of a professional, specialized collection agency.”65 
Still other courts have different definitions for professional persons. The 
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Delaware has established its own 
definition for what constitutes a professional.66 This court holds that there are 
two prongs in a determination of whether a person is a professional under 
§ 327(a).67 To satisfy the first prong, one must be “a professional in a broad 
sense[,]” and to satisfy the second prong, one must be a professional “engaged 
to assist the trustee (or debtor in possession) in his or her duties . . . .”68 The court 
settled on this approach because it felt that the test set out in Matter of Seatrain 
Lines, Inc. addresses the second prong of § 327(a) but not the first prong—the 
definition of professional.69 This test states that: 
For the purposes of section 327(a), “professional person” is limited to 
persons in those occupations which play a central role in the 
administration of the debtor proceeding . . . . Court approval is required 
for the retention of [a professional person, who is] intimately involved 
in the administration of the debtor’s estate.70  
According to this court, the four examples provided by the statute—attorneys, 
accountants, appraisers, and auctioneers—make it apparent that the licensing of 
the skill is not a prerequisite to being classified as a professional under § 327(a) 
because appraisers and auctioneers need not be licensed.71  
In one example of this two part analysis in action, the court had to consider 
whether a debt collection agency qualified as a professional under § 327(a).72 
The court noted that generally in debt collection there is an element of skill 
involved, but that this skill is relatively easily mastered without significant 
training or education.73 However, in this case the services of the debt collection 
 
 64 Id. at *11. 
 65 Id. at *13 (internal quotations omitted).  
 66 See In re Metro. Hosp., 119 B.R. 910, 916 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990). 
 67 Id.  
 68 Id.  
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 916–17.  
 73 Id. at 917. 
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agency were not only debt collection, but an extensive process that included 
interviewing patients, reviewing their treatment records, determining which 
patients might be Medicaid eligible, and submitting a timely application for 
eligibility for that individual.74 Then—if eligibility were granted—the debt 
collector would submit the debtor’s request for reimbursement and would be 
responsible for insuring that the state was required to pay under the Medicaid 
regulations.75 These services required a “specialized knowledge of the Medicaid 
statute and regulations . . . the use of proper forms, strict compliance with the 
time deadlines involved, the skills of a social worker in interviewing patients, 
and perhaps even a knowledge of the administrative hearing process for 
contesting the denial of MA eligibility”—all tasks undertaken only after 
particularized training conducted or supervised by attorneys and experienced 
non-attorneys.76 As a result, the court determined that the debt collector satisfied 
the first prong of the § 327(a) test. However, the court then had to consider the 
second prong—assisting the debtor in possession in the performance of duties 
that “were required . . . by virtue of its fiduciary status as debtor in possession.”77 
The court here expanded the scope of § 327(a), stating that it applied to far more 
than just professionals assisting the trustee in the exercise of his duties that are 
administrative tasks, but to all those who assist the chapter 11 debtor in 
possession in operating its business “in a prudent, competent fashion . . . .”78  
Courts have been widespread in their application of what constitutes a 
professional. Categories of individuals who have been considered professionals 
under the Bankruptcy Code include: brokers of real or personal property, leasing 
agents for aircraft, architects, management consultants, financial consultants or 
experts, investment banking firms, oil and gas consultants, oil and gas operators, 
credit adjustment companies, collection agencies, public relations firms, 
managers of commercial real estate, and engineering and industry management 
consulting firms.79 Specifically regarding consulting agencies, court rulings are 
varied. In one case, the New York court held that computer consultants did not 
qualify as professionals because computer consultants are not professionals in 
the same sense as doctors, lawyers, accountants, engineers, architects, and 
others, who are held to a higher standard of care under the law.80 
 
 74 Id. at 916. 
 75 Id. at 917. 
 76 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 77 Id.  
 78 Id. at 918. 
 79 Rosemary Williams, Approval of employment of professional persons under 11 U.S.C.A. §. 327(a) and 
Bankruptcy Rule 2014 nunc pro tunc, 133 A.L.R. Fed. 465 (1997).  
 80 Hosp. Comput. Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp. 1351, 1361 (D.N.J. 1992).  
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2. Various Tests for Who Qualifies as a Disinterested Person 
Once it has been determined that an individual or entity is subject to § 327(a) 
by virtue of being a professional person, that individual must consider whether 
they are disinterested. Again, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is not clear on what is 
the appropriate level of disinterestedness, although it does provide slightly more 
guidance when compared to the Code’s treatment of professional persons. For 
ordinary lawyers, there is an additional consideration in the constraints imposed 
by the Rules of Professional Conduct, which are often looked to by courts for 
guidance in determining whether there exists a conflict of interest––however, 
this issue is not completely relevant here as we are considering professional 
persons and their disinterested requirement.81  
Section 327(a) states that the trustee may employ professional persons “that 
do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are 
disinterested persons, to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the 
trustee’s duties under this title.”82 The Code defines a disinterested person as a 
person that:  
[I]s not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider . . . and does 
not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or 
of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any 
direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the 
debtor, or for any other reason.83  
Some courts interpret the disinterested standard strictly, disqualifying any 
professional who has actual or potential conflicts of interest with the debtor, 
while others only disqualify the professional if it holds interests that are 
materially adverse to the estate.84 
Again, the phrase “interest materially adverse to the estate” is not defined in 
the Bankruptcy Code, but has been held to mean:  
Holding or representing an interest adverse to the estate as possessing, 
or serving as an attorney for a person possessing, either an economic 
interest that would tend to lessen the value of the bankruptcy estate or 
that would create either an actual or potential dispute in which the 
 
 81 Robert J. Landry & James R. Higdon, Ethical Considerations in Appointment and Compensation of an 
Attorney for a Chapter 11 Debtor-in-Possession, 66 MISS. L.J. 355, 401 (1996). 
 82 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2019).  
 83 11 U.S.C. §101(14) (2019). 
 84 Amer. Bankr. Inst., ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
4, 52 (2015). 
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estate is a rival claimant . . . or . . . a predisposition under the 
circumstances that render such a bias against the estate.85 
The strict interpretation of the disinterested person standard holds that the catch-
all provision86 in 11 U.S.C. §101(14) is broad enough to include any “interest or 
relationship that would even faintly color the independence and impartial 
attitude required by the [C]ode . . . .”87 Courts using this interpretation have 
adopted a “‘full panoply of events and elements’ or ‘totality of the 
circumstances’ test to determine whether a particular conflict is materially 
adverse to the estate[,]” with an emphasis on providing the judge in the case with 
as much information as possible, facilitating a decision at his discretion.88 In 
determining “whether the security interest coveted by counsel can be tolerated 
under the particular circumstances[,]” this test considers:  
the reasonableness of the arrangement and whether it was negotiated 
in good faith, whether the security demanded was commensurate with 
the predictable magnitude and value of the foreseeable services, 
whether it was a needed means of ensuring the engagement of 
competent counsel, and whether or not there are telltale signs of 
overreaching. The nature and extent of the conflict must be assayed, 
along with the likelihood that a potential conflict might turn into an 
actual one. An effort should be made to measure the influence the 
putative conflict may have in subsequent decision making. Perceptions 
are important; how the matter likely appears to creditors and to other 
parties in legitimate interest should be taken into account. There are 
other salient factors as well: whether the existence of the security 
interest threatens to hinder or to delay the effectuation of a plan, 
whether it is (or could be perceived as) an impediment to 
reorganization, and whether the fundamental fairness of the 
proceedings might be unduly jeopardized (either by the actuality of the 
arrangement or by the reasonable public perception of it).89 
Additionally, the Court notes that this list of factors is by no means exhaustive, 
but that the most important fact is that the bankruptcy judge be given an 
immediate opportunity to make an intelligent appraisal of the potential conflict 
and to apply his “experience, common sense, and knowledge of the particular 
proceeding” to bear on the issue of disinterestedness.90 This standard mandates 
 
 85 Landry & Higdon, supra note 81, at 364 (internal quotation omitted) (alterations omitted).  
 86 §101(14) (“the term ‘disinterested person’ means a person that—does not have an interest materially 
adverse to the interest of the estate . . . for any . . . reason.”).  
 87 Dye v. Brown (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 530 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). 
 88 Id. 
 89 In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 182 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 90 Id. 
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a per se disqualification if there exists actual conflicts of interest, and allows the 
district court discretion to dismiss parties with a potential conflict of interest.91 
In contrast, other courts hold that the disinterested standard is less strict. In 
determining whether there is a conflict, the court need not ask whether a conflict 
exists, but “‘whether a potential conflict, or the perception of one renders the 
lawyer’s interest materially adverse to the estate or the creditors.’”92 This same 
Court expanded upon the adverse interest definition stating that an adverse 
interest is the:  
possession or the assertion [of] mutually exclusive claims to the same 
economic interest, thus creating either an actual or potential dispute 
between rival claimants as to which . . . of them the disputed right or 
title to the interest in question attaches under valid and applicable law; 
or (2) [the possession of] a predisposition or interest under 
circumstances that render such a bias in favor of or against one of the 
entities.93  
The court further stated that the test is not subjective but it contemplates “‘an 
objective screening for even the appearance of impropriety,’” and the court 
noted that there can be a disqualifying conflict even absent proof of actual loss 
or injury.94  
In spite of formulating this less strict test, the First Circuit has stated that the 
statutory requirements “serve [an] important policy of ensuring that all 
professionals appointed pursuant to [§] 327(a) tender undivided loyalty and 
provide untainted advice and assistance in furtherance of their fiduciary 
responsibilities.”95 Further, “[§] 327(a) is designed to limit even appearances of 
impropriety to the extent reasonably practicable,” therefore “doubt as to whether 
a particular set of facts gives rise to a disqualifying conflict of interest normally 
should be resolved in favor of disqualification.”96 
3. Bankruptcy Rule 2014(a) Disclosure Requirements 
In addition to the requirements set out in § 327(a), professional parties 
seeking employment in a bankruptcy proceeding must meet the requirements 
 
 91 See id. at 182–83.  
 92 Beal Bank, S.S.B. v. Waters Edge Ltd. P’ship, 248 B.R. 668, 695 (D. Mass. 2000); In re Marvel 
Entertainment Group, 140 F.3d 463, 476 (3d Cir. 1998).  
 93 Rome v. Braunstein, 19 F.3d 54, 58 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted) (alteration in 
original); Beal Bank, S.S.B., 248 B.R. at 695. 
 94 Beal Bank, S.S.B., 248 B.R. at 695 (internal citation omitted).  
 95 Rome, 19 F.3d at 58. 
 96 Id. at 60.  
MCMULLAN_7.15.20 7/15/2020 2:02 PM 
486 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 36 
established in Rule 2014(a). This rule states that professionals seeking 
employment pursuant to § 327 must file an application that states, to the best of 
the applicant’s knowledge, all of the person’s connections with the debtor, 
creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants, 
the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office of the United 
States trustee.97 There is a simple goal of this disclosure requirement: “to ensure 
undivided loyalty to the estate and to preserve public confidence in the fairness 
of the bankruptcy system.”98 “The disclosure requirements of Rule 2014 are 
strictly applied and impose an independent duty upon the professional 
applicant[,]” therefore “failure to comply . . . is a sanctionable violation.”99 Even 
still, in applying this rule, courts are split on what constitutes a connection. 
One court holds that “the professional must disclose all facts that bear on his 
disinterestedness, and cannot usurp the court’s function by unilaterally choosing 
which connections impact on his disinterestedness and which do not.”100 Courts 
applying this holding believe that the disclosure requirements under Rule 
2014(a) are broader than the rules governing disqualification under § 327(a), and 
that an applicant must disclose all connections regardless of whether they are 
sufficient to rise to the level of a disqualification under that section.  
Other courts, however, have not been quite as strict in their application of 
Rule 2014(a), holding that professionals “need not disclose every past or remote 
connection with every party in interest,” but must “disclose those presently or 
recently existing, whether they are business or personal in nature, which could 
reasonably have an effect on the attorney’s judgment in the case.”101 The court 
further stated that the “‘parties in interest’ includes entities holding ‘claims’ 
against the debtor and those whose pecuniary interests might be directly and 
adversely affected by the proposed action.”102 In determining the sufficiency of 
disclosures, potential employees should balance “the plain language of the rule’s 
mandate that applicants disclose ‘all connections’” with a “common sense 
analysis of what connections are reasonably defined as pertinent to the ultimate 
question of disinterestedness” in order to lessen the burden of disclosures which 
may deter competent professions from representing parties in bankruptcy 
 
 97 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014(a) (2018).  
 98 In re Sundance Self Storage-El Dorado LP, 482 B.R. 613, 625 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012).  
 99 9 Collier on Bankruptcy P 2014.05 (16th ed. 2020).  
 100 Quarles & Brady LLP v. Maxfield (In re Jennings), 199 F. App’x 845, 848 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal 
citation omitted).  
 101 Drew v. Latimer, Biaggi, Rachi & Godreau (In re El Comandante Mgmt. Co., LLC), 395 B.R. 807, 
814 (D.P.R. 2008) (emphasis added).  
 102 Id. at 817 (citing In re Savage Indus., 43 F.3d 714, 720 (1st Cir. 1994)). 
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cases.103 Indeed, there is an argument that the only connections that must be 
disclosed under Rule 2014 are relations that a professional had with entities that 
are parties in interest in the instant case, by virtue of parallel involvement in 
other cases.104 Some courts have even stated that the only connections requiring 
disclosure are fee sharing arrangements that might affect the court’s decision to 
approve employment.105 
4. Penalties for Violation of 11 U.S.C. § 327 
Section 328(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides the penalties imposed on 
professionals that violate the disinterested standard set out in § 327. This section 
states that: 
[T]he court may deny allowance of compensation for services and 
reimbursement of expenses of a professional person employed under 
section 327 . . . if, at any time during such professional person’s 
employment . . . such professional person is not a disinterested person, 
or represents or holds an interest adverse to the interest of the estate 
with respect to the matter on which such professional person is 
employed.106  
In applying this section of the Code, the remedies available to courts include 
“disqualification and the denial or disgorgement of all fees.”107  
5. Jay Alix v. McKinsey and the Application of the Established Tests 
The above requirements serve as the underlying issue in Alix v. McKinsey & 
Co.108 Alix is the founder of AlixPartners, a major consulting firm that has a 
significant presence in the bankruptcy area, which Alix alleges McKinsey 
entered and stole business using its illegal policies.109 Alix brought suit against 
McKinsey RTS—the restructuring arm of McKinsey’s business; McKinsey & 
Co.—who owns and controls McKinsey RTS; and various McKinsey senior 
executives and partners, including Dominic Barton—managing partner of 
McKinsey & Co., Kevin Carmody—partner and senior executive of McKinsey 
RTS, Jon Garcia—senior partner and founding executive of McKinsey RTS, 
 
 103 In re FiberMark, Inc., 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 4029, at *38 (Bankr. D. Vt.). 
 104 Id. at *29. 
 105 9 Collier on Bankruptcy, P2014.05 (16th ed. 2020); see In re Arlan’s Dept. Stores, Inc. 615 F.2d 925, 
932 (2d Cir. 1979).  
 106 11 U.S.C. § 328(c) (2019). 
 107 Rome v. Braunstein, 19 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 1994).  
 108 See Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
 109 See id. at 1. 
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Seth Goldstrom, Alison Proshan—associate general counsel for McKinsey, and 
Robert Sternfels.110 
The lawsuit is the latest in a string of confrontations and lawsuits between 
McKinsey and its employees, and Alix. According to McKinsey’s motion to 
dismiss, Alix began confronting McKinsey leaders about its Rule 2014(a) 
disclosures, which he deemed to be non-compliant and illegal.111 Over the 
course of several years, Alix confronted Dominic Barton—McKinsey’s 
managing partner—eleven times, all initiated by Alix, including three in-person 
meetings.112 Throughout these meetings, Alix attempted to convince Barton that 
McKinsey RTS was not compliant with Rule 2014(a)’s requirements, however 
McKinsey asserts that it was compliant, as affirmed by multiple bankruptcy 
courts—but that Alix’s “uniquely personal interpretation” of Rule 2014(a) is 
incorrect.113  
After these initial encounters, Alix upped his efforts. He formed an LLC—
Mar-Bow Value Partners, LLC, whose sole function was to purchase a creditor 
claim for “pennies on the dollar” in the Alpha Natural Resources bankruptcy.114 
Through this company, Alix began complaining to the U.S. Trustee regarding 
McKinsey’s disclosures in the course—disclosures which had already been 
considered and allowed by the bankruptcy judge in that case and in which the 
complaints were not joined by any other creditor involved in the case.115 
Following these complaints, the U.S. Trustee filed a motion to compel 
McKinsey to make additional disclosures beyond its normal practices, which 
consisted of merely describing the parties the firm had connections with, rather 
than specifically naming the companies.116 McKinsey complied, and submitted 
a supplemental disclosure that satisfied the U.S. Trustee’s standards—with the 
court even stating that it was “‘completely satisfied that there is not any type of 
disinterested problem with McKinsey going forward’ and that it was ‘very 
satisfied with the information’” McKinsey submitted.117  
Alix, however, was not satisfied. He filed a motion to clarify and even 
challenged the debtor’s entire plan of reorganization, an action which left the 
 
 110 See id. at 98–100. 
 111 Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 12, Jay Alix v. McKinsey, 404 F. Supp. 3d 827 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 
2018) (No. 18-cv-04141). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id.  
 114 Id. at 13. 
 115 Id.  
 116 Id. at 12. 
 117 Id. at 14. 
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court “bewildered” and “confused[,]” resulting in the court rejecting both of 
Alix’s challenges.118 These rejections still did not deter Alix—he next moved to 
stay the implementation of the plan—an action which was again rejected by the 
court.119 Finally, Alix continued to appeal the decision up to the district court in 
Mar-Bow Value Partners, LLC v. McKinsey Recovery & Transformation 
Services US, LLC.120 Recently, more activity has taken place. In an incredibly 
rare move, the judge in the Alpha Natural Resources bankruptcy case reopened 
the case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350(b), which provides that “[a] case may be 
reopened in the court in which such case was closed to administer assets, to 
accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.”121 At the time of reopening the 
case, the judge made no conclusions about McKinsey’s alleged misconduct, but 
that the continuation of hearings will allow the court to determine whether 
McKinsey’s actions undermined the fundamental fairness of the bankruptcy 
proceedings.122 
In the complaint, Alix states that McKinsey’s racketeering activity was 
“calculated to harm AP,” and that McKinsey knew it would be disqualified from 
employment under § 327 due to its extensive roster of clients and alumni 
connections.123 In its complaint, Alix asserts that when considering whether a 
professional is disinterested, bankruptcy courts consider multiple factors, 
including:  
[1] whether the professional possesses or asserts for a client any 
economic interest that would tend to lessen the value of the bankruptcy 
estate or create either an actual or potential dispute in which the estate 
would be a rival claimant; [2] whether the professional possesses a 
predisposition under the circumstances to be biased against the estate; 
[3] whether the professional has some interest or relationship that 
would even faintly color the independence and impartial attitude 
required by the Code; [4] whether it is likely that the professional will 
be placed in a position permitting it to favor one interest over an 
impermissibly conflicting interest; [5] whether the professional is 
serving the debtors with undivided loyalty and providing untainted 
advice and assistance; and [6] the likelihood that a potential conflict 
 
 118 Id. (alterations omitted). 
 119 Id. at 12.  
 120 Mar-Bow Value Partners, LLC v. McKinsey Recovery & Transformation Servs. US, LLC, 578 B.R. 
325 (E.D. Va. 2017). 
 121 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (2019). 
 122 Morgenson & Corrigan, supra note 6. 
 123 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 2.  
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might turn into an actual or the influence that a conflict might have on 
the professional’s decision making.124  
The complaint asserts that McKinsey’s connections are extensive, citing 
McKinsey’s website which states that McKinsey offers consulting services in 
everything from advanced electronics to paper and forest products industries.125  
Indeed, it is logical that McKinsey will have numerous potential connections 
to almost any company, considering its status as the biggest of the “Big Three” 
consulting firms and the fact that over a quarter of its alumni have proceeded to 
found their own businesses upon leaving McKinsey, with nearly 400 of them 
leading $1 billion enterprises worldwide,126 a feat that earns McKinsey the honor 
of having more alumni currently serving as Fortune 500 CEOs than any other 
company.127 As a result of the connections, McKinsey cannot perform its 
duties—such as assisting the debtors in managing the chapter 11 bankruptcy 
process, including managing outside stakeholders—because, among the outside 
stakeholders McKinsey is charged with managing, are McKinsey’s own 
clients.128 
According to the complaint, in multiple cases McKinsey has failed to 
disclose a single connection, either throughout the case or, at a minimum, prior 
to confirmation of chapter 11 plans.129 Allegedly, over a thirteen year period, 
McKinsey accepted eight restructuring cases in which they failed to comply with 
the disclosure requirements of § 327(a) and Rule 2014(a).130 For example, in the 
Hayes bankruptcy case, McKinsey did not name a single connection to any 
interested parties, despite filing three separate affidavits.131 Similarly, McKinsey 
filed two affidavits in the UAL bankruptcy case—the first of which named zero 
connections to any interested parties in the case, and the second of which—filed 
after McKinsey’s employment had already been approved by the bankruptcy 
 
 124 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 15–16. 
 125 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 18. 
 126 McKinsey & Company, VAULT (2020), https://www.vault.com/company-profiles/management-
strategy/mckinsey-company. 
 127 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 15. 
 128 Id. at 90. 
 129 See id. at 29. 
 130 See Emiko Bd. v. AMF Bowling Worldwide, Inc. (In re AMF Bowling Worldwide, Inc.), 520 B.R. 
185 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014); In re Edison Mission Energy, 502 B.R. 830 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013); In re AMR 
Corp., 478 B.R. 599 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Harry & David Holdings, Inc., No. 11-BR-10884 (Bankr. D. 
Del. Mar. 28, 2011); In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 402 B.R. 596 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Mirant Corp., 354 
B.R. 113 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); In re Hayes Lemmerz Int’l, Inc., 340 B.R. 461 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006); In re 
UAL Corp., 307 B.R. 80 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 131 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 22. 
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court—named eleven interested parties that were current McKinsey clients. This 
is notable considering that some of the parties named in the UAL case—
JPMorgan Chase and Bank One Corporation and The Boeing Company—were 
also parties in the Hayes case, where McKinsey did not name the very same 
companies it later stated as interested parties to which it had connections.132 
McKinsey, however, believes that this lack of disclosure is a feature of its 
business, rather than wrongdoing, telling bankruptcy courts that it cannot 
disclose connections due to “its responsibility to maintain strict client 
confidentiality.”133  
In his prayer for relief, Jay Alix requests, among other things, that McKinsey 
must disgorge all moneys received as a result of their illegal activities, per 
§ 328(c).134 Were the court to grant this request, the consequences would be 
enormous. According to Alix’s complaint, McKinsey has received tens of 
millions in bankruptcy fees that it would not have otherwise earned if it had to 
disclose its connections or were disqualified due to these connections.135 
Through its “racketeering scheme,” McKinsey has allegedly earned $101 
million in the form of bankruptcy consulting fees.136 Were the allegations in 
Alix’s complaint proved, McKinsey would have to pay huge fines as required 
under convictions for bankruptcy fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 
152(3), and 152(6); mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; wire fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1503(a); witness tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b) and 1512(c); 
unlawful monetary transactions in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957; and 
inducement to interstate or foreign travel in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, in 
addition to the fees McKinsey would owe due to disgorgement under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 328(c).137  
Alix states that damages to AlixPartners (AP) include, but are not limited to, 
fees from bankruptcy consulting engagements AP would have earned in the 
absence of McKinsey’s unlawful conduct, other lost business opportunities (i.e., 
pre- and post-bankruptcy work AlixPartners would have received had it been 
able to form a relationship with debtor companies), and attorneys’ fees and 
costs—including the attorneys’ fees and costs associated with exposing and 
 
 132 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 22–23. 
 133 Morgenson & Corrigan, supra note 6. 
 134 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 144. 
 135 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 2. 
 136 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 2. 
 137 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 1341, 1343, 1503, 1512, 1956, 1957, 2314 (2018); 11 U.S.C. § 328 (2019). 
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litigating the criminal activities engaged in by McKinsey.138 Additionally, were 
the allegations to be proved true, Alix would be entitled to recover treble 
damages, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), which provides that “any person 
injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of § 1962 of this 
chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and 
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including 
a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .”139 
Alix alleges that McKinsey formed McKinsey RTS— the restructuring 
portion of McKinsey’s business—“for the purpose of facilitating, committing, 
perpetuating, and concealing the fraudulent and other criminal conduct alleged 
herein with the aim of unlawfully depriving AP of bankruptcy consulting 
engagements it otherwise would have obtained.”140 Additionally, Alix states that 
McKinsey RTS is distinct from McKinsey & Co.’s other entities not for any 
legitimate reasons, but because McKinsey hoped to “add a veneer of 
indirectness” and use McKinsey RTS as a pretext for withholding the numerous 
connections McKinsey has to debtors and bankruptcy proceeding participants, 
as well as to conduct the racketeering from a separate legal entity, walling off 
the illegal activities from the rest of McKinsey’s business operations.141 
McKinsey, meanwhile, states that its alleged connections to various companies 
are not a legitimate issue because the companies are customers of McKinsey’s 
main consulting organization or investments of McKinsey’s investment arm, 
MIO Partners, Inc., which are separate entities from McKinsey RTS, which is 
“intentionally separate” and “follows policies designed to avoid conflicts of 
interest . . . .”142 
In response to this lawsuit, McKinsey stated that the company’s disclosure 
met all the legal requirements and described Alix’s suit as “baseless and anti-
competitive litigation . . . .”143 Additionally, McKinsey filed a motion to dismiss, 
arguing that Alix’s complaint is deficient in numerous respects.144  
In spite of McKinsey’s claims and several setbacks in court, Alix has 
continued his litigation against McKinsey, and has also attracted the interest of 
the United States trustee and the United States Attorney’s Office in Manhattan. 
 
 138 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 124. 
 139 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2018). 
 140 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 94. 
 141 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 94–95. 
 142 Morgenson & Corrigan, supra note 6.  
 143 Mary Williams Walsh, McKinsey Hid Conflicts of Interest from Courts, Lawsuit Says, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/business/jay-alix-mckinsey-lawsuit.html.  
 144 See Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, supra note 111, at 18. 
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The United States trustee stated that “McKinsey failed to satisfy its obligations 
under bankruptcy law and demonstrated a lack of candor with the court and 
USTP,” and entered into a $15 million settlement agreement, which McKinsey 
states was not an admittance of wrongdoing but “provided additional clarity for 
the filing of future disclosures.”145 The United States Attorney’s Office, 
meanwhile, was reportedly investigating whether McKinsey used its influence 
over bankruptcy clients to steer assets to itself and its clients over competing 
creditors.146 Alix’s litigation against McKinsey has continued, most recently in 
the Westmoreland Coal Co. bankruptcy, where Alix again objects to limited 
disclosures by McKinsey—a position that is supported by the United States 
Justice Department, who objected to McKinsey’s work in the Westmoreland 
case.147 This case will be especially important, as it is in one of the main 
bankruptcy venues in the country, Houston, Texas, and thus could serve to create 
a firm precedent for how courts should treat such disclosure requirements in the 
future. The judge in charge of the case appears to agree, promising a definitive 
ruling on disclosure requirements at the end of the trial, and stating that he does 
not “want to ever do this again.”148 While the litigation has been delayed due to 
the coronavirus pandemic, once it resumes the court has an opportunity to 
resolve this definitional issue once and for all.  
B. Analysis 
Considering the various standards set out in different courts, this Comment 
suggests a consistent standard should be applied to what constitutes a 
professional person and disinterested person under § 327(a), what the adequate 
level of disclosures is under Rule 2014(a), and recommends, in part, how the 
court should resolve the issues it is faced with in Alix v. McKinsey & Co. In 
establishing a consistent standard, the court should: 1) adopt the six-part test for 
determining a professional set out by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Delaware in In re American Tissue, Inc.;149 2) adopt the strict definition of 
disinterested as set out by the Fourth Circuit in In re Martin;150 3) require an 
extensive level of disclosures similar to the amount set forth by the standard 
 
 145 Morgenson & Corrigan, supra note 6 (internal quotations omitted).  
 146 Walsh, supra note 143.  
 147 Tom Corrigan, McKinsey Foe Alleges ‘Game of Hide and Seek’ at Bankruptcy Trial, WALL ST. J. 
(Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mckinsey-foe-alleges-game-of-hide-and-seek-at-bankruptcy-trial-
11580934518. 
 148 Id. 
 149 See supra Section A1. 
 150 See supra Section A2. 
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established in In re Jennings by the Eleventh Circuit;151 and 4) rule for Jay Alix 
in his case against McKinsey & Co. While several of these tests include multi-
factor balancing tests and reasonability standards that might seem unclear at 
first, the abundance of case law laying the framework for interpreting these tests 
will be sufficient to create a clear standard. Additionally, perhaps more 
important than selecting a clear standard with bright-line rules guiding 
application, is the adoption of consistent tests across all jurisdictions, in order to 
prevent forum shopping and confusion in the bankruptcy theater. In selecting 
these standards and tests, it is important to keep in mind the reasons § 327(a) 
and Bankruptcy Rule 2014(a) were adopted: “to ensure undivided loyalty to the 
estate and to preserve public confidence in the fairness of the bankruptcy 
system[,]”152 as well as the two fundamental goals of bankruptcy: “a fresh start 
for the debtor and equal treatment of creditors.”153 
1. A Broad Definition of Professional Persons Under § 327(a) 
In In re Am. Tissue, Inc., the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware 
established a six-factor test to consult when confronted with the issue of whether 
or not an individual or entity is a professional.154 The six factors are:  
(1) whether the employee controls, manages, administers, invests, 
purchases or sells assets that are significant to the debtor’s 
reorganization; (2) whether the employee is involved in negotiating 
the terms of a Plan of Reorganization; (3) whether the employment is 
directly related to the type of work carried out by the debtor or to the 
routine maintenance of the debtor’s business operations; (4) whether 
the employee is given discretion or autonomy to exercise his or her 
own professional judgment in some part of the administration of the 
debtor’s estate; (5) the extent of the employee’s involvement in the 
administration of the debtor’s estate; and (6) whether the employee’s 
services involve some degree of special knowledge or skill, such that 
the employee can be considered a “professional” within the ordinary 
meaning of the term.155  
No single factor is dispositive, but the factors should be weighed against each 
other and considered in total.156 This test is, in part, inspired by the qualitative 
 
 151 See supra Section A3. 
 152 In re Sundance Self Storage-El Dorado LP, 482 B.R. 613, 625 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012). 
 153 In re Martin, 197 B.R. 120, 127 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996). 
 154 See In re Am. Tissue, Inc., 331 B.R. 169 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005). 
 155 Id. at 173 (citing In re First Merchants Acceptance Corp., 1997. Bankr. LEXIS 2245, at *3 (D. Del. 
1997)). 
 156 Id. (citing In re First Merchants Acceptance Corp., 1997. Bankr. LEXIS 2245, at *3). 
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and quantitative tests discussed previously,157 but presents an expansive 
definition inclusive of the important elements of each test that encompasses a 
broad range of individuals under the term “professional.” 
Courts should adopt this rule because it provides for a broad definition of 
professional that is at the discretion of the judge—an experienced bankruptcy 
expert knowledgeable about the topic and familiar with the rationales behind the 
statutory provisions in bankruptcy. However, this may change as cases are 
appealed up the ladder.158 A multi-factored balancing test is effective for three 
reasons: (1) it is simple; (2) it is descriptive; and (3) it is just.159 Again, in 
adopting standards, the bankruptcy court must keep in mind its general goals—
a fresh start for the debtor and equal treatment of creditors. The multi-factored 
balancing test more accurately satisfies these general goals—particularly the 
equal treatment of creditors provision.  
Ensuring that the debtor is adequately represented by educated professionals 
who have been properly vetted by the bankruptcy court and who are required to 
go through the disclosures processes required by Rule 2014(a) and § 327(a) 
provides for a more effective, fair, and profitable bankruptcy experience for all 
parties, but most importantly, for creditors, by making for a robust, transparent 
bankruptcy process. Additionally, this combined approach is best because it 
offers the advantage of considering all aspects of the alleged professional’s 
involvement in the bankruptcy proceeding. In contrast, the quantitative test from 
In re Seatrain Lines, Inc. merely focuses on the significance of the individual’s 
role to the debtor proceeding,160 while the qualitative test from In re Fretheim 
merely focuses on the amount of discretion the individual has in accomplishing 
that role.161  
When adopting tests regarding specific provisions, the bankruptcy court 
must also consider the specific goals of those provisions, in this case “to ensure 
undivided loyalty to the estate and to preserve public confidence in the fairness 
 
 157 See supra Section A(3)(b). 
 158 See Frank H. Easterbrook, What’s So Special about Judges?, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 772, 779–80 (1990). 
Although a balancing test is perhaps even more useful for judges relatively inexperienced with bankruptcy, such 
as those at the appellate levels, according to Judge Frank Easterbrook, “what happens when you turn a generalist 
loose in a complex world? An ignorant or unwise judge will be unaware of his limits and is apt to do something 
foolish. A sophisticated judge understands that he is not knowledgeable and so tries to limit the potential damage. 
How is this done? By and large, it is done by constructing ‘five-part balancing tests.’ Not only judges but also 
the leaders of the bar find this approach congenial. The American Law Institute’s Restatements teem with multi-
factor approaches.” Id. 
 159 See Patrick McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585, 622 (1988).  
 160 See In re Seatrain Lines, Inc., 13 B.R. 980, 981 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 161 See In re Fretheim, 102 B.R. 298, 299 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989). 
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of the bankruptcy system.”162 This multi-factor balancing test is most effective 
in accomplishing these goals. It considers all aspects of how the professional 
seeking employment will be assisting in the bankruptcy process. This allows the 
judge to make an effective determination of (1) whether the individual/entity 
should properly be considered a professional, and (2) whether it is appropriate 
for the debtor in possession or trustee to hire such a professional to assist in the 
bankruptcy process. The broad definition also promotes the goal of ensuring 
undivided loyalty to the estate because it encompasses more professionals, who 
will thus fall under the § 327(a) requirements—resulting in disclosures under 
Rule 2014(a) and the disqualification requirements from § 327(a) itself being 
applied to the professional, providing for a more complete, transparent 
bankruptcy process. While the application of balancing tests is not always 
entirely consistent, the presence of six clear factors to guide a group of 
experienced professionals such as the judges sitting on the bankruptcy court 
should be sufficient to guide preliminary decisions by entities involved in the 
bankruptcy process, such as AlixPartners and McKinsey, in the future. 
Additionally, this definition provides an extensive list of what bankruptcy judges 
should consider. While there is still some discretion available to judges, there 
are at least far more guidelines than some of the other formulations, such as 
whether the individual is “a professional in a broad sense.”163  
2. Disinterested Standard Under § 327(a) 
Section 327(a) of the Code states that the trustee “may employ one or more 
attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons, 
that do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are 
disinterested persons, to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the 
trustee’s duties under . . . 11 U.S.C. § 101.”164 Regarding what qualifies as 
disinterested under § 327(a), the court should again use a strict standard, in this 
case the one previously adopted by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits,165 which states 
that the catch-all provision in § 101(14)166 is broad enough to include any 
“interest or relationship that would even faintly color the independence and 
impartial attitude required by the code.”167 This test requires the application of 
 
 162 In re Sundance Self Storage-El Dorado LP, 482 B.R. 613, 625 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012). 
 163 In re Metro. Hosp., 119 B.R. 910, 916 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990). 
 164 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2019). 
 165 See Dye v. Brown (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 530 F.3d 832, 837–38 (9th Cir. 2008); see also In re 
Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 182 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 166 See generally 11 U.S.C. §101(14) (2019) (“the term ‘disinterested person’ means a person that—does 
not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate . . . for any . . . reason”). 
 167 In re AFI Holding, Inc., 530 F.3d at 838. 
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a “totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether a particular conflict 
is materially adverse to the state.168 Two aspects of this totality of the 
circumstances test are worth paying special note to. First, “[p]erceptions are 
important; how the matter likely appears to creditors and to other parties in 
legitimate interest should be taken into account.”169 Second, “whether the 
fundamental fairness of the proceedings might be unduly jeopardized (either by 
the actuality of the arrangement or by the reasonable public perception of it).”170 
The inclusion of these two factors in the test is important, because they mirror 
the second reason for the disclosure requirements under Rule 2014(a): “to 
preserve public confidence in the fairness of the bankruptcy system.”171 
This test is most effective because it more accurately captures the two goals 
for the required disclosures and disinterested standard.172 Additionally, the less 
strict standard, which states that the court need not ask whether a conflict exists, 
but “whether a potential conflict, or the perception of one renders the lawyer’s 
interest materially adverse to the estate or to creditors,”173 is contradictory to the 
standards the courts applying it seek to uphold. In applying this test, the First 
Circuit has stated that the statutory requirements “serve an important policy of 
ensuring that all professionals appointed pursuant to [§] 327(a) tender undivided 
loyalty and provide untainted advice and assistance in furtherance of their 
fiduciary responsibilities.”174 The court also stated that “[§] 327(a) is designed 
to limit even appearances of impropriety to the extent reasonable 
practicable. . . .”175 Surely a stricter test would better serve the goal of limiting 
“even appearances of impropriety” by requiring the professional seeking 
 
 168 See In re Martin, 817 F.2d at 182 (In determining whether the security interest coveted by counsel can 
be tolerated under the particular circumstances, the test considers: “the reasonableness of the arrangement and 
whether it was negotiated in good faith, whether the security demanded was commensurate with the predictable 
magnitude and value of the foreseeable services, whether it was a needed means of ensuring the engagement of 
competent counsel, and whether or not there are telltale signs of overreaching. The nature and extent of the 
conflict must be assayed, along with the likelihood that a potential conflict might turn into an actual one. An 
effort should be made to measure the influence the putative conflict may have in subsequent decision making. 
Perceptions are important; how the matter likely appears to creditors and to other parties in legitimate interest 
should be taken into account. There are other salient factors as well: whether the existence of the security interest 
threatens to hinder or to delay the effectuation of a plan, whether it is (or could be perceived as) an impediment 
to reorganization, and whether the fundamental fairness of the proceedings might be unduly jeopardized (either 
by the actuality of the arrangement or by the reasonable public perception of it).”). 
 169 Id.  
 170 Id.  
 171 In re Sundance Self Storage-El Dorado LP, 482 B.R. 613, 625 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012). 
 172 See id. at 624–25 (“To ensure undivided loyalty to the estate and to preserve public confidence in the 
fairness of the bankruptcy system.”).  
 173 In re Martin, 817 F.2d at 182.  
 174 Rome v. Braunstein, 19 F.3d 54, 58–60 (1st Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). 
 175 Id. at 60.  
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employment to submit connections to the court, who then decides whether, in 
totality, there is a conflict of interest.176 
3. Extensive Disclosures Required Under Bankruptcy Rule 2014(a) 
Rule 2014(a) states that to be employed as a professional, an application that 
details “all of the person’s connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party 
in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, 
or any person employed in the office of the United States trustee” must be 
filed.177 This application must be “accompanied by a verified statement of the 
person to be employed setting forth the person’s connections with the debtor, 
creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants, 
the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office of the United 
States trustee.”178 When seeking employment, courts should require 
professionals to meet the Rule 2014(a) disclosure requirement set out by the 
Eleventh Circuit in In re Jennings, which sets forth a strict requirement that the 
professional seeking employment “must disclose all facts that bear on his 
disinterestedness, and cannot usurp the court’s function by unilaterally choosing 
which connections impact on his disinterestedness and which do not.”179 This 
standard is quite broad, as courts applying this holding reason that the disclosure 
requirements set forth in Rule 2014(a) are broader than the rules governing 
disqualification, and that, to satisfy these rules, a professional seeking 
employment must disclose all connections, regardless of whether they believe 
they are sufficient to rise to the level necessitating disqualification under 
§ 327(a).  
This test is much more strict than other formulations, which state that 
professionals seeking employment “need not disclose every past or remote 
connection with every party in interest . . . [but] . . . must disclose those presently 
or recently existing, whether they are of business or personal in nature, which 
could reasonably have an effect on the attorney’s judgment in the case.”180 This 
requirement to “disclose all facts that bear on his disinterestedness,” rather than 
relying on a reasonableness standard will certainly be more costly and result in 
lengthier bankruptcy proceedings than adoption of a reasonableness standard, as 
 
 176 Id.  
 177 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014(a) (2018). 
 178 Id. 
 179 Quarles & Brady LLP v. Maxfield (In re Jennings), 199 F. App’x 845, 848 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
In re Gulf Coast Orthopedic Ctr., 265 B.R. 318, 323 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001). 
 180 Drew v. Latimer, Biaggi, Rachi & Godreau (In re El Comandante Mgmt. Co., LLC), 395 B.R. 807, 
814 (D.P.R. 2008) (quoting In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 239 B.R. 635, 647 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
MCMULLAN_7.15.20 7/15/2020 2:02 PM 
2020] JAY ALIX, MCKINSEY, AND A LACK OF CLARITY 499 
the judge must consider all possible connections, rather than only those that the 
professional deems relevant. However, there are two benefits to the adoption of 
this strict standard. First, a stricter standard is more in line with the goal of Rule 
2014(a): “to ensure undivided loyalty to the estate and to preserve public 
confidence in the fairness of the bankruptcy system.”181 Certainly a system 
which provides the bankruptcy court with all the information available will 
better provide undivided loyalty to the estate, as well as to preserve confidence 
in the fairness of the system, than a test which gives discretion to professionals 
seeking employment as to whether they believe a connection might impact their 
decision-making during the bankruptcy process. Secondly, a reasonableness 
standard is harder to apply and will result in inconsistencies in what constitutes 
reasonable between jurisdictions—precisely the problem the courts are currently 
facing in the absence of a common, easily applicable standard.  
4. Alix v. McKinsey & Co. and the Application of Strict Standards 
Regarding Jay Alix’s suit versus McKinsey, it must first be determined 
whether McKinsey is a professional under § 327(a), using the test discussed 
above.182 If the answer to this question is yes, it raises the question of whether 
McKinsey qualifies as disinterested under § 327(a), again using the test 
discussed above.183 And finally, there is the question of whether McKinsey’s 
disclosures meet the requirements discussed above.184 While Alix has faced 
difficulties in obtaining standing in his various proceedings against McKinsey, 
the underlying issues are still relevant and worthy of discussion.185 
a. McKinsey’s Status as a Professional 
Using the definition from the test set out in In re Am. Tissue, Inc., McKinsey 
is clearly a professional according to the Bankruptcy Code. Under this test, the 
court considers the following six factors:  
(1) whether the employee controls, manages, administers, invests, 
purchases or sells assets that are significant to the debtor’s 
reorganization; (2) whether the employee is involved in negotiating 
 
 181 In re Sundance Self Storage-El Dorado LP, 482 B.R. 613, 625 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012) (emphasis 
added). 
 182 See supra Section B1.  
 183 See supra Section B2. 
 184 See supra Section B3.  
 185 See Tom Corrigan, McKinsey Dodges Lawsuit Targeting Its Bankruptcy Disclosures, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mckinsey-dodges-lawsuit-targeting-its-bankruptcy-disclosures-
11566255695). 
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the terms of a Plan of Reorganization; (3) whether the employment is 
directly related to the type of work carried out by the debtor or to the 
routine maintenance of the debtor’s business operations; (4) whether 
the employee is given discretion or autonomy to exercise his or her 
own professional judgment in some part of the administration of the 
debtor’s estate . . .; (5) the extent of the employee’s involvement in the 
administration of the debtor’s estate . . .; and (6) whether the 
employee’s services involve some degree of special knowledge or 
skill, such that the employee can be considered a “professional” within 
the ordinary meaning of the term.186  
While no single factor from this test is dispositive, and the circumstances should 
be considered in toto, McKinsey satisfies several of them.187  
According to a report by the Wall Street Journal, McKinsey’s role in the 
bankruptcy process went so far as to devise the reorganization plan for the 
companies it services,188 while Alix’s complaint states that McKinsey “secured” 
confirmation of the plan of reorganization.189 Additionally, McKinsey’s website 
advertises its services as including the creation of “a blueprint for successful 
long-term recovery of the business” and, in the case of judicially driven or 
formal restructurings, McKinsey offers “comprehensive support[.]”190 Based on 
this information, it is clear that McKinsey, at a minimum, satisfies factor two as 
it is involved in formulating and negotiating the terms of a plan of 
reorganization. While no one factor is dispositive, satisfying factor two is strong 
evidence that McKinsey is a professional under the In re Am. Tissue, Inc. six-
part test. 
b. McKinsey’s Violation of the Disinterested Standard from Section 
327(a) 
Because McKinsey qualifies as a professional, it is subject to the 
disinterested standard as set forth in § 327(a), which provides that anyone may 
be employed provided that they are: 
 
 186 In re Am. Tissue, Inc., 331 B.R. 169, 173 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (citing In re First Merchants 
Acceptance Corp., 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2245, at *3 (D. Del. 1997)). 
 187 See generally Alix v. McKinsey & Co., 404 F. Supp. 3d 827, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (granting motion to 
dismiss RICO claim because plaintiff did not satisfy RICO’s proximate cause standard). As readily determinable 
by information at hand as of Jan. 12, 2019. More information will become available as the case against McKinsey 
proceeds. 
 188 See Morgenson & Corrigan, supra note 6. 
 189 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 19. 
 190 Corporate Restructuring and Turnarounds, MCKINSEY & CO., https://www.mckinsey.com/business-
functions/rts/how-we-help-clients/corporate-restructuring-and-turnarounds. 
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[N]ot a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider . . . [and] does 
not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or 
of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any 
direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the 
debtor, or for any other reason.191  
The proper test is that set forth in Dye v. Brown, which has already been adopted 
by both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits,192 and articulates that the catch-all 
provision in § 101(14)193 is “broad enough to include . . . [any] interest or 
relationship that ‘would even faintly color the independence and impartial 
attitude required by the code.’”194 This test requires the application of a totality 
of the circumstances test to determine whether a particular conflict is materially 
adverse to the state.195 One aspect of this totality of the circumstances test is 
worth paying special note to: “perceptions are important; how the matter likely 
appears to creditors and to other parties in legitimate interest should be taken 
into account.”196 Additionally, other salient factors include “whether the 
fundamental fairness of the proceedings might be unduly jeopardized (either by 
the actuality of the arrangement or by the reasonable public perception of it).”197 
While an individual factor by itself is not dispositive under this test, these factors 
are of particular importance considering the publicity that has been brought to 
Alix’s case against McKinsey, as well as the various bankruptcies McKinsey 
has been involved in, as a result of the Wall Street Journal’s various exposés 
against McKinsey. 
 
 191 11 U.S.C. §101(14) (2019). 
 192 See Dye v. Brown (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 530 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Martin, 817 F.2d 
175, 182 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 193 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) (“The term ‘disinterested person’ means a person that—does not have an 
interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate . . . for any . . . reason.”). 
 194 Dye v. Brown (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 530 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting In re AFI Holding, 
Inc., 355 B.R. 139, 149 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006)). 
 195 See In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 182 (4th Cir. 1987) (The test considers: “the reasonableness of the 
arrangement and whether it was negotiated in good faith, whether the security demanded was commensurate 
with the predictable magnitude and value of the foreseeable services, whether it was a needed means of ensuring 
the engagement of competent counsel, and whether or not there are telltale signs of overreaching. The nature 
and extent of the conflict must be assayed, along with the likelihood that a potential conflict might turn into an 
actual one. An effort should be made to measure the influence the putative conflict may have in subsequent 
decision making. Perceptions are important; how the matter likely appears to creditors and to other parties in 
legitimate interest should be taken into account. There are other salient factors as well: whether the existence of 
the security interest threatens to hinder or to delay the effectuation of a plan, whether it is (or could be perceived 
as) an impediment to reorganization, and whether the fundamental fairness of the proceedings might be unduly 
jeopardized (either by the actuality of the arrangement or by the reasonable public perception of it).”). 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id.  
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Here, it is likely that McKinsey would not be considered disinterested under 
the totality of the circumstances test. When determining “whether the security 
interest coveted by counsel can be tolerated under the particular circumstances,” 
salient factors include:  
whether the existence of the security interest threatens to hinder or to 
delay the effectuation of a plan, whether it is (or could be perceived 
as) an impediment to reorganization, and whether the fundamental 
fairness of the proceedings might be unduly jeopardized (either by the 
actuality of the arrangement or by the reasonable public perception of 
it).198  
While there has yet to be a complaint by one of the participants in a bankruptcy 
managed by McKinsey, the complaints by Alix, and others, have gained much 
notoriety, including being the subject of a multi-page exposé in the Wall Street 
Journal.199 Indeed, the allegations featured in the Wall Street Journal exposé 
resulted in the bankruptcy judge in charge of the Alpha Natural Resources 
bankruptcy reopening the case to look into these allegations, which he called the 
“most serious” the judge had ever seen—that McKinsey had a major investment 
in a hedge fund run by Whitebox Advisors, LLC, an Alpha Natural Resources 
creditor who received the bankrupt company’s most valuable asset.200 This suit 
was later dismissed due to Alix not having standing to bring the case,201 but the 
point remains: this notoriety is not acceptable, particularly under the totality of 
the circumstances test set forth in Dye v. Brown—it serves to undermine the 
fundamental fairness of the bankruptcy proceedings. Allowing misconduct of 
the sort Alix is alleging McKinsey engaged in will only serve to lessen public 
confidence in the effectiveness and fairness of the bankruptcy system and is 
contrary to the principles that form the basis of the bankruptcy system.  
One factor in particular: “whether the fundamental fairness of the 
proceedings might by unduly jeopardized (either by the actuality of the 
arrangement or by the reasonable public perception of it)” is especially troubling 
when considering Alix’s case against McKinsey.202 While the full details of what 
actually transpired will be revealed in the trial, at a minimum the abundance of 
Wall Street Journal reports and attention that this case has received, the fact that 
 
 198 In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 182 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 199 See Morgenson & Corrigan, supra note 6.  
 200 Tom Corrigan & Gretchen Morgenson, Judge Reopens Bankruptcy Case, Citing Allegations McKinsey 
Hid Investments, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-reopens-bankruptcy-case-
citing-allegations-mckinsey-hid-investments-11547077920). 
 201 Tom Corrigan, Judge Reins in Jay Alix’s Bankruptcy Brawl with McKinsey, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-reins-in-jay-alixs-bankruptcy-brawl-with-mckinsey-11558380704. 
 202 In re Martin, 817 F.2d at 182. 
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the United States trustee has issued condemnations of McKinsey, as well as the 
fact that the judge in the Alpha Natural Resources case has reopened the case in 
light of further revelations of McKinsey’s lack of disclosures, all point to the 
fact that the proceedings McKinsey has involved in are lacking fundamental 
fairness—if not in reality, then certainly in the “reasonable public perception of 
it.”203 Additionally, it is clear that in most, if not all of the bankruptcy cases 
listed in Alix’s complaint, the bankruptcy judge was not given an immediate 
opportunity to make an intelligent appraisal of the potential conflict and to apply 
his “experience, common sense, and knowledge of the particular proceeding” to 
bear on the issue of disinterestedness—a requirement that courts applying this 
test consider to be the most important factor in the § 327(a) disclosure 
requirements.204  
c. McKinsey’s Failure to Satisfy Bankruptcy Rule 2014(a) Disclosures 
Regarding the Rule 2014(a) disclosures, McKinsey responds that its 
disclosures were “robust and comprehensive[,]” stating that in Alix’s complaint 
Alix did not append any of the allegedly deficient disclosures and quickly 
skipped past their actual content in the complaint.205 Accordingly, across the 
thirteen bankruptcy cases implicated in the suit, McKinsey submitted thirty-nine 
declarations totaling more than 498 pages that disclosed McKinsey’s 
connections to interested parties and set forth the process through which 
McKinsey identified these connections.206  
However, the above recommended disclosure requirements207 state that 
bankruptcy professionals must “disclose all facts that bear on his 
disinterestedness, and cannot usurp the court’s function by unilaterally choosing 
which connections impact on his disinterestedness and which do not.”208 Under 
other, less strict formulations, McKinsey might be considered to have satisfied 
its disclosure requirements. However, because the proper disinterested standard 
is the strict test set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in In re Jennings, McKinsey 
has not satisfied its obligation under Rule 2014(a).  
In reviewing past cases mentioned in Alix’s brief, it is clear that McKinsey 
has not disclosed all facts that bear on its disinterestedness. In multiple cases, 
 
 203 Id.  
 204 Id.; see Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1. 
 205 Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, supra note 111, at 9. 
 206 Motion to Dismiss, supra note 111, at 9.  
 207 See supra Section A3. 
 208 Quarles & Brady LLP v. Maxfield (In re Jennings), 199 F. App’x 845, 848 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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McKinsey has not disclosed any connections at the beginning of the bankruptcy 
procedure, but only later after the process was already well underway, if at all.209 
Additionally, even after the late disclosures, McKinsey has failed to detail a 
complete list of connections, such as in the Alpha Natural Resources case, where 
Duke Energy, a client of McKinsey’s, was also a major customer of Alpha 
Natural Resources.210 In its response to Alix’s previous assertions that 
McKinsey is not disinterested, McKinsey has stated that clients of the main 
McKinsey consulting services are separate from clients of McKinsey RTS, as 
well as that McKinsey’s investment division, MIO, is a separate organization; 
however, these claims ring hollow since McKinsey RTS and MIO share various 
directors and board members.211 In conclusion, McKinsey violated the 
disclosure requirements as required by the test promulgated in In re Jennings, as 
required by Rule 2014(a).  
In addition to the questions posed in the bankruptcy context, above, the case 
against McKinsey also alleges various criminal actions.212  
d. Criminal Allegations 
There are various criminal allegations against McKinsey, for which it is 
helpful to have a brief overview of the allegations, as well as the elements 
necessary to prove them. These allegations include: bankruptcy fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 152(3), and 152(6); mail fraud in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1341; wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; obstruction of 
justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a); witness tampering in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1512(b) and 1512(c); unlawful monetary transactions in violation of 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957; inducement to interstate or foreign travel in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314; and promissory estoppel.213 These allegations 
clearly hinge on whether McKinsey satisfied the tests above, but the allegations 
also have their own requirements. While it is impossible to determine whether 
McKinsey satisfied each element of these various crimes until discovery reveals 
McKinsey’s thought-processes in the bankruptcy process, it is worth noting 
 
 209 See Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 21–32.  
 210 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 51. Full details of the connections McKinsey allegedly 
hid can be found in the Complaint and Jury demand. 
 211 Gretchen Morgenson & Tom Corrigan, McKinsey Advised GenOn Energy about Bankruptcy Case 
while Having Interest in Outcome, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mckinsey-
advised-genon-energy-about-bankruptcy-case-while-having-interest-in-outcome-11545345478); Complaint 
and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 32.  
 212 Discussed infra Section B(4)(d).  
 213 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 2.  
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some of the crimes alleged and the elements necessary to prove them, and 
analyzing the ones for which sufficient facts are apparent. 
In his suit, Alix alleges McKinsey committed bankruptcy fraud in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 152(3), and 152(6).214 These provisions provide that a 
person who “(2) knowingly and fraudulently makes a false oath or account in or 
in relation to” any bankruptcy case; “(3) knowingly and fraudulently makes a 
false declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury 
as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, or in relation to any” bankruptcy; 
“[or] (6) knowingly and fraudulently gives, offers, receives, or attempts to obtain 
any money or property, remuneration, compensation, reward, advantage, or 
promise thereof for acting or forbearing to act in any” bankruptcy case “shall be 
fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”215 
This crime is fairly straightforward: if McKinsey is a professional under the 
Code and required to be disinterested and meet the requirements of Rule 
2014(a), then it will be guilty provided that its inadequate disclosures and claims 
to be disinterested were knowingly dishonest. Clearly McKinsey knew that it 
had connections to interested parties in the bankruptcies it was involved—the 
only question remaining is whether it truly believed these connections did not 
fall under the disclosure requirements, or whether it knew that the connections 
were supposed to be disclosed, yet hid them anyway. If McKinsey knew these 
connections fell under the disclosure requirements, McKinsey clearly committed 
bankruptcy fraud. An individual violates 18 U.S.C. § 1956 if:  
knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction 
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, he conducts 
or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact 
involves the proceeds of specified unlawful . . . knowing that the 
transaction is designed in whole or in part . . . to conceal or disguise 
the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity.216 
Proving mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341requires satisfying two 
elements: “(1) a scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing of a letter, etc. for the 
purpose of executing the scheme.”217 Additionally, the scheme need not have 
“contemplate[d] the use of the mails as an essential element.”218  
 
 214 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 2. 
 215 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2018).  
 216 United States v. Dennis, 237 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)) 
(internal quotations omitted)).  
 217 Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954).  
 218 Id.  
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The crime of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 requires proving 
two elements: “(1) a scheme to defraud and (2) the use of interstate 
communications in furtherance of the scheme.”219  
Wire fraud and mail fraud will be relatively easy to prove if Alix is able to 
prove that McKinsey knowingly and fraudulently lied about its disclosures in 
the bankruptcy cases on which it worked. If it truly did so knowingly, it will be 
clear that McKinsey was engaged in an ongoing scheme to defraud, as the fraud 
continued over multiple years and bankruptcies.  
It has been formulated by at least one court that proving obstruction of justice 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) requires: 1) a nexus between the individual’s 
conduct and judicial proceedings; 2) the conduct must have relation in time, 
causation, or logic with judicial proceedings and must have natural and probable 
effect of interfering with due administration of justice; 3) the individual must 
have had specific intent to do some act or acts which tend to influence, obstruct, 
or impede due administration of justice; 4) the individual’s motivation is 
irrelevant under § 1503(a); and 5) where the individual unquestionably intended 
to undertake the act, with full knowledge that it would impede due 
administration of justice, that is all law requires in order to show specific intent 
to influence, obstruct, or impede due administration of justice.220  
To prove violations of inducement to interstate or foreign travel in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, one must establish the following elements: “(1) unlawful 
or fraudulent intent in the (2) transportation in interstate commerce of (3) any 
falsely made securities with (4) knowledge that securities were falsely made.”221 
Punishment can be imposed in the form of a fine or imprisonment of up to ten 
years, or both.222 This analysis is closely tied to that of the bankruptcy fraud, as 
whether or not McKinsey truly had fraudulent intent is the main consideration 
of that charge, as well as the first element of this charge.223 
In the case’s sixth cause of action, Alix asserts promissory estoppel, stating 
that on October 16, 2014, McKinsey & Co., through its Managing Partner 
Dominic Barton, promised AlixPartners that it would dissolve McKinsey RTS 
“because of its unlawful activity, and cease providing bankruptcy consulting 
services [by] January 2015.”224 As a result of this promise, AlixPartners 
 
 219 United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1171 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 220 Alwan v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 507, 514 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 221 United States v. Mitchell, 588 F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 1979).  
 222 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2018). 
 223 Mitchell, 588 F.2d at 483.  
 224 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 142. 
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refrained from commencing litigation against McKinsey for the illegal practices 
described above, but McKinsey breached its promise to AlixPartners by 
continuing to provide bankruptcy consulting services to debtors after January 
2015.225 The elements of promissory estoppel are: “(1) defendant made an 
unambiguous promise to plaintiff; (2) plaintiff relied on such promise; (3) 
plaintiff’s reliance was expected and foreseeable by defendants; and (4) plaintiff 
relied on the promise to its detriment.”226  
This claim of promissory estoppel stems from an October 16, 2014 meeting, 
in which Alix and Dominic Barton, a global managing partner at McKinsey & 
Co., discussed McKinsey’s alleged pay-to-play operation.227 After an initial 
meeting in which Alix disclosed to Barton that he believed McKinsey’s actions 
were illegal under the Code, Barton ask for some time to review the applicable 
law and McKinsey’s action, after which Barton had determined the behavior was 
illegal and “expressed incredulity” that the directors of McKinsey RTS would 
engage in such conduct.228 Barton then promised that, after his upcoming re-
election as managing partner, he would remove the senior leadership of 
McKinsey RTS from their positions due to their illegal behavior, as well as 
remove McKinsey from the bankruptcy business altogether—in return, Alix 
would “remain patient and refrain from acting at that time on the issues he had 
raised.”229 The promised actions never occurred, however, resulting in the 
inclusion of this cause of action, because Alix did not bring litigation in reliance 
on the promise by Barton. 
This cause of action is not likely to succeed—there is no true detrimental 
reliance. Alix claims that as a result of the promises by Barton, he did not bring 
legal action against McKinsey. While we only have Alix’s side of the story, his 
record of events seems to make clear that Barton made an unambiguous promise 
to Alix to shut down the operations of McKinsey’s restructuring group, thus the 
first element is satisfied. Additionally, there seems to be no doubt the Alix 
reasonably relied on the promise. The issue, however, lies in Alix’s claim of 
injury as a result of this reliance. His injury, he claims, is that he did not bring 
litigation against McKinsey, and thus missed out on potential damages from 
litigation.230 This argument holds no weight, however, as Alix is currently 
 
 225 Id.  
 226 Firestone Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 796 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Newton Tractor Sales, Inc. v. 
Kubota Tractor Corp., 906 N.E.2d 520, 523–24 (2009)).  
 227 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 36. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. at 36–38. 
 230 See id. at 142. 
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bringing litigation, and thus is eligible for damages that will remedy the past 
transgressions against him. A better argument would be that he was damaged by 
not obtaining several bankruptcy cases that occurred after the meeting in which 
Barton allegedly promised to exit the bankruptcy business and not seek any new 
cases. However, even this argument is baseless, as this injury is entirely 
speculative—there is no way to determine that, even in the absence of 
McKenzie, Alix would have been awarded the bankruptcy contract over some 
other consulting firm.  
CONCLUSION 
The recently filed case Alix v. McKinsey & Co. is an excellent tool to reveal 
several deficiencies in the bankruptcy system. While it is not entirely clear 
whether McKinsey & Co.’s restructuring group, McKinsey RTS, knew what the 
proper amount of disclosures required of them are and simply flouted these 
requirements in an attempt to maintain their brand reputation of client 
confidentiality, or whether they believed that a minimum level of disclosures 
was required to satisfy the disclosure requirements set forth in Rule 2014(a) and 
that they truly did qualify as disinterest under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). Either way, 
the case has brought to the forefront of bankruptcy the reality that the definition 
of who qualifies as a professional under § 327(a), who qualifies as disinterested 
under § 327(a), and what are the full extent of the disclosure requirements under 
Rule 2014(a) is not clear. This lack of clarity has resulted in circuit splits and 
even splits within circuits regarding who is subject to the disinterested 
requirement under § 327(a), what this disinterested requirement entails, and how 
much information a professional seeking employment in a bankruptcy case must 
divulge to the bankruptcy court under Rule 2014(a).  
The court in Alix v. McKinsey & Co. has an opportunity to resolve some of 
these definitional issues. This Comment suggests the following solutions. First, 
the court should adopt the six-part test for defining professional as set out by the 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Am. Tissue, Inc., in which 
the court considers: (1) whether the employee controls, manages, administers, 
invests, purchases or sells assets that are significant to the debtor’s 
reorganization; (2) whether the employee is involved in negotiating the terms of 
a Plan of Reorganization; (3) whether the employment is directly related to the 
type of work carried out by the debtor or to the routine maintenance of the 
debtor’s business operations; (4) whether the employee is given discretion or 
autonomy to exercise his or her own professional judgment in some part of the 
administration of the debtor’s estate; (5) the extent of the employee’s 
involvement in the administration of the debtor’s estate; and (6) whether the 
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employee’s services involve some degree of special knowledge or skill, such 
that the employee can be considered a “professional” within the ordinary 
meaning of the term.231 Second, the court should adopt the strict definition of 
disinterested as set out by the Fourth Circuit in In re Martin, where the Court 
considers the totality of the circumstances in its determination of whether the 
professional is disinterested.232 Third, the court should establish a broad 
disclosure rule similar to the rule set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in In re 
Jennings, where the Court required professionals to “disclose all facts that bear 
on his disinterestedness, and cannot usurp the court’s function by unilaterally 
choosing which connections impact on his disinterestedness and which do 
not.”233  
While the allegations against McKinsey are serious and, if true, represent a 
threat to the fairness and effectiveness of the bankruptcy system, they also offer 
the opportunity to fix aspects of the bankruptcy system that have holes, allowing 
the court to ensure that such actions, are not repeated. The court has an 
opportunity to prevent further confusion and lack of cohesion between 
bankruptcy jurisdictions, and it may capitalize on this opportunity by adopting 
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